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Between 1999 and 2007, WR Hambrecht has completed 19 IPOs in the U.S. using an 
auction mechanism. We analyze investor behavior and mechanism performance in these 
auctioned IPOs using detailed bidding data. The existence of some bids posted at high prices 
suggests that some investors (mostly retail) try to free-ride on the mechanism. But institutional 
demand in these auctions is very elastic, suggesting that institutional investors reveal information 
in the bidding process. Investor participation is largely predictable based on deal size, and 
demand is dominated by institutions. Flipping is equally prevalent in auctions as in bookbuilt 
deals – but unlike in bookbuilding, investors in auctions tend to flip their shares more in cold 
deals. Finally, we find that institutional investors, who provide more information, are rewarded 
by obtaining a larger share of the deals that have higher initial returns. Our results therefore 
suggest that auctioned IPOs could be an effective alternative to traditional bookbuilding. 
 
JEL classification codes: G24, G32 







In 1999, WR Hambrecht introduced the OpenIPO auction mechanism in the United States 
to compete with the bookbuilding approach, which effectively had complete control over IPO 
issuances before then. Between 1999 and 2007, WR Hambrecht was the lead underwriter in 19 
auctioned IPOs.
1   This paper provides an analysis of investor behavior and mechanism 
performance in these IPOs using detailed bidding data from these auctions. We find that 
auctioned IPOs perform well under two important criteria: they exhibit highly elastic (i.e. 
informative) demand, and they attract strong and predictable participation from institutional 
investors. Our results suggest that auctioned IPOs could therefore be an effective alternative to 
traditional bookbuilding. 
IPOs have been notoriously hard to price for the issuer and the underwriter as demonstrated 
by significant variance in first day returns (Lowry, Officer and Schwert, 2006). An important aim 
of the IPO selling mechanism is to extract information from investors that will enable a more 
accurate pricing of the issue. A series of theoretical papers have analyzed the pros and cons of 
bookbuilding versus other IPO mechanisms. Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and 
Wilhelm (1990), Spatt and Srivastava (1991), and Sherman (2000) argue that the bookbuilding 
mechanism, thanks to its pricing and allocation flexibility, allows underwriters to elicit truthful 
information revelation from informed investors. Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002), and Biais, 
Bossaerts, Rochet (2002) take a mechanism-design approach to characterize the optimal IPO 
mechanism, and show that under certain assumptions, the Mise en Vente, a modified auction 
                                                 
1 WR Hambrecht was also a co-manager in the auctioned IPOs of Google in 2004 and NetSuite in 2007, and one of 
the lead managers in the auctioned IPO of Rackspace in August 2008.  
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mechanism used in France, exhibits information-extraction properties similar to bookbuilding. 
Sherman (2005), on the other hand, suggests that with costly information acquisition, auctions 
can lead to sub-optimal information production and free-riding by uninformed investors. 
Because of the lack of detailed IPO bidding data available from investment bankers, few 
empirical papers have addressed these issues. Exceptions include Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 
2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004, 2007) who analyze bidding and allocation in European 
bookbuilt IPOs. Cornelli and Goldreich find that order books contain information that is used to 
price bookbuilt deals and that investors who provide information receive better allocations. 
Jenkinson and Jones use a different sample of bookbuilt IPOs and take a survey of institutional 
investors, and conclude that the information extraction role of bookbuilding is limited. Kandel, 
Sarig and Wohl (1999) analyze demand curves in Israeli auctioned IPOs. Liu, Wei and Liaw 
(2001), Lin, Lee, and Liu (2007), and Chiang, Qian, and Sherman (2008) analyze bidding in 
Taiwanese auctioned IPOs. Taiwanese auctioned IPOs are discriminatory: Successful bidders pay 
the price they bid. As such they are different from the U.S. auctioned IPOs we study in this paper: 
In the U.S. the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that all successful investors 
pay the same price (such auctions are called “non-discriminatory”).
2 
                                                 
2 Other empirical studies have compared bookbuilding and auctions without using detailed bidding data. Using data 
from countries in which several mechanisms were available, Derrien and Womack (2003), Kaneko and Pettway 
(2003) and Kutsuna and Smith (2004) document lower mean underpricing and lower fees for auctioned vs. bookbuilt 
IPOs. Jagannathan and Sherman (2007) take a more global approach and document that virtually every country that 
has allowed issuers to use auctions has abandoned this mechanism. Degeorge, Derrien and Womack (2007) argue 
that the search for better analyst coverage may explain the willingness of issuers to choose bookbuilding over 
auctions, in spite of the higher fees and underpricing associated with bookbuilding. Ritter and Welch (2002) and 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) discuss agency problems that can arise with bookbuilding. Several studies have analyzed  
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Our detailed bidding data from the universe of U.S. auctioned IPOs enable us to weigh in 
empirically on the bookbuilding/auction debate. There are two main potential concerns about 
auctioned IPOs. First, the non-discriminatory feature of auctioned IPOs in the U.S. potentially 
creates an incentive for uninformed investors to place bids at very high prices (quasi-market 
orders), effectively free-riding on informed investors’ information. Widespread free-riding might 
disrupt the price discovery process. Second, compared to bookbuilding, auctioned IPOs are a 
decentralized mechanism, leaving less room for the underwriter to actively promote the IPO, 
hence creating a risk of unexpectedly low participation. We examine these two issues empirically 
and conclude that these concerns are largely unwarranted. 
We do find some evidence of free riding: retail investors are much more likely than 
institutional investors to place high – presumably uninformative – bids. However, free riding by 
retail investors does not impede the auctioned IPO mechanism’s ability to extract information 
from investors. We construct the demand curves for our sample of auctioned IPOs, and we argue, 
as others before us, that a high elasticity of the demand curve is indicative of high information 
content in investors’ bids.
3 We find that the demand curves in our U.S. sample are on average 
more elastic than those estimated in previous studies of bookbuilt deals. The median elasticity of 
demand at the IPO price is 34.6 in our sample of auctioned IPOs. Using the same measure of 
demand elasticity, Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) report a median elasticity of demand of 3.6 in 
their sample of European bookbuilt IPOs. We also find, importantly, that the demand curve for 
institutional investors is much more elastic than that of retail investors. We conclude that in spite 
                                                                                                                                                              
Treasury auctions, which are quite different from IPOs, as information extraction is not a primary concern (Back and 
Zender, 1993; Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan, 2002; Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist, 2005. 
3 See for instance Kandel, Sarig and Wohl (1999).  
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of evidence of some free-riding by retail investors, WR Hambrecht’s IPO auction mechanism is 
successful at eliciting information from institutional investors. 
We also find that auctioned IPOs attract strong participation from institutional investors: 
Institutions account for about 84 percent of demand in dollar value, and they receive about 87 
percent of the shares offered in the IPO, on average. Moreover, the main driver of participation is 
the size of the deal – a characteristic that is known to all before the deal goes through – 
suggesting that participation is largely predictable. 
The spirit of auctions is to allow investor bids to determine the price. But in seven out of 19 
deals, the investment banker, WR Hambrecht, and the issuer chose an IPO price at a discount to 
the auction clearing price. We find that a discount was more likely and higher when the clearing 
price was affected by high bids (and therefore likely to contain “froth”) and when there was less 
investor consensus in the demand curve. 
A desirable property of an IPO selling mechanism is its ability to place shares in “safe 
hands” – that is, with investors who are unlikely to resell them immediately after the offering (a 
practice know as “flipping”). Flipping is mostly a concern in “cold” deals – that is, deals with 
poor initial stock price performance – because it effectively forces the underwriter to buy back 
shares or possibly suffer significant price declines. We find that the amount of flipping in these 
auctioned IPOs is similar to that documented for U.S. bookbuilt IPOs. However, for auctioned 
IPOs, flipping is more prevalent in “cold” deals, in contrast to the patterns documented in U.S. 
bookbuilt IPOs (Aggarwal, 2003). We conclude that the IPO auction mechanism has, so far, been 
less successful than bookbuilding at allocating shares to “safe hands.” We conjecture that it may 
be harder to discourage investors from flipping auctioned IPOs, perhaps because the IPO auction 
mechanism rules prevent the underwriter from “punishing” flippers by withdrawing allocations in 
future deals.  
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Interestingly, while the allocation of shares in IPO auctions is not discriminatory, we find 
that retail investors get a higher proportion of the worst performing deals. This suggests that 
informational free riding by retail investors potentially at the expense of institutions does not 
curtail institutions’ informational advantage: Institutions appear to be compensated for the 
information they provide in the pricing process. 
In a nutshell, our results suggest that free riding happens in auctioned IPOs, but it does not 
wreck the mechanism. Auctioned IPOs exhibit strong and predictable institutional participation 
and highly elastic demand curves, indicating high information content in the bids. Institutions are 
compensated for the information they provide in the form of higher returns than those retail 
investors obtain. Our results imply that the auction IPO mechanism is an effective alternative to 
traditional bookbuilding. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the OpenIPO 
mechanism. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 reports summary statistics of our sample. 
Sections 5 to 10 report our results on bidding, investor participation, the demand elasticity of the 
demand curves, pricing, flipping, and investor returns. Section 11 concludes. 
 
2. The IPO Auction Mechanism 
 
WR Hambrecht’s OpenIPO mechanism works as follows: First, WR Hambrecht announces 
the number of shares to be offered to the public as well as an indicative price range, and 
organizes a road show in which the deal is presented to potential investors, similar to the familiar 
bookbuilding approach. The auction opens approximately two weeks before the scheduled IPO 
date. Investors can then submit price/quantity bids. Investors can submit multiple bids at tiered 
price levels, and bid prices can be outside the indicative price range. Bids can be cancelled or  
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modified until the closing of the auction, which happens typically a few hours before the pricing 
of the deal. 
When the auction closes, WR Hambrecht constructs a demand curve and calculates the 
clearing price, which is the highest price at which the number of shares asked for is at least equal 
to the number of shares offered (including shares in the overallotment option if the underwriter 
decides to exercise this option). WR Hambrecht then meets with the issuer to decide on the IPO 
price, which can be at or below the clearing price.
4 The issuer can also decide to adjust the 
number of shares offered to the public. Price and quantity adjustments are de facto limited by an 
SEC rule that specifies that the issuer needs to refile the IPO if the proceeds (IPO price multiplied 
by the number of shares offered) differ from the proceeds announced in the last pre-IPO 
prospectus by more than 20%. Once the price has been chosen, investors who bid at or above the 
IPO price receive shares at that price.
5 When there is excess demand at the price chosen for the 
IPO, investors receive shares on a pro rata basis.
6 
The key distinction between the auction mechanism and the traditional bookbuilding 
mechanism used in most U.S. initial public offerings is that the auction mechanism leaves the 
underwriter less discretion in share allocation. The other features of the IPOs in our sample are 
similar to those observed in traditional U.S. IPOs. For example, in all the IPOs in our sample the 
                                                 
4 Auctions in which the price can be set below the clearing price are sometimes called “dirty Dutch” auctions. 
5 There is only one exception to this allocation rule in the nineteen IPOs of our sample. In the Andover.net IPO, in 
December 1999, the IPO price was set at $18, but only investors with bids at or above $24 received shares. 
6 The allocation rule is such that investors always receive round lots. Due to this rule, in case of excess demand 
investors with similar price/quantity bids (in particular investors who submit small bids) can receive slightly different 
allocations. However, it is important to note that apart from these marginal adjustments, investors are treated equally, 
i.e., two investors that submit the same bid have the same ex ante expected allocation, whatever their identity.  
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underwriter receives an overallotment option, in seventeen out of nineteen, pre-IPO shareholders 
have 180-day lockups, and eighteen of them are firm-commitment deals. 
 
3. The data 
 
For the nineteen auctioned IPOs in which WR Hambrecht was the lead underwriter 
between 1999 and 2007, we have the demand schedule from all investors at the time of the 
closing of the auction process. The data contain the following information, for each of the bids in 
the demand schedule: 
- The type of broker through which the investor submitted his bids. There are typically five 
broker types: “WRH institutional”, “WRH Middle Markets” and “WRH retail” are used for 
bids submitted directly to WR Hambrecht by institutional investors, middle market 
investors (typically small institutions), and retail investors, respectively. The “Co-
Managers” label is used for bids submitted through one of the co-managers of the deal. 
Finally, the “Selling Group” label is used for investors who submit their bids through other 
brokers who participate in the deal as selling group members. 
- The identity of investors. The dataset contains the name of institutional investors that 
place their bids through the “WRH institutional”, “WRH Middle Markets”, and “Co-
Managers” channels in sixteen deals, which allows us to follow the bidding of institutional 
investors across these deals.
7 When investors bid through selling group members, they are 
identified with codes, so we do not know the investor’s identity or type (institution or 
retail). 
                                                 
7 This information is missing in the first three deals completed by WR Hambrecht.  
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- The bids submitted by investors. For each bid, we observe the number of shares and the 
price of the bid, as well as the allocation received.  
We obtained data on the characteristics of the IPOs from final prospectuses, and data on 
aftermarket prices and trading volumes from CRSP. Finally, for a sub-sample of eleven IPOs, we 
have access to flipping reports, which indicate whether investors who received shares in the IPO 
sell these shares in the month following the offering. The Depositary Trust Corp. (DTC) collects 
these data from all the selling group members and sends them to WR Hambrecht.
8 For 
institutional investors that bought their shares through WR Hambrecht and co-managers, flipping 
reports contain the identity of the investor and the number of shares flipped within 30 days of the 
IPO. For retail investors who bid directly through WR Hambrecht and for all investors that bid 
through selling group members, flipping reports contain the aggregate amount of flipping. 
 
4. Summary statistics 
  
All the IPOs in our sample were listed on the Nasdaq. Over the nine sample calendar years, 
the annual number of auctioned IPOs varies between one and five. The average proceeds of an 
auctioned IPO were $107 million, compared to $188 million for the entire U.S. IPO population in 
the same period.
 9 Similar to other IPOs, the size distribution of our sample is right-skewed, with 
one very large deal, Interactive Brokers Group, which raised $1,200 million in May 2007. The 
median age of auctioned IPOs (7 years) is similar to that of the average U.S. IPO (8 years). In 
                                                 
8 For a detailed description of the DTC IPO Tracking system, see Aggarwal (2003). 
9  The numbers reported for U.S. bookbuilt IPOs are taken from http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2007sorts.pdf, 
unless specified otherwise.  
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bookbuilt IPOs, fees exhibit significant clustering at exactly 7% of the proceeds (Chen and Ritter, 
2000). In our sample of auctioned IPOs, the fees vary between 1.9% and 7%, and average 5.5%. 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
We examine the bidding of institutional and retail investors separately in many of our 
analyses. In our 37,570 bids, 25,856 that were submitted through the “WRH retail” channel or 
through a retail broker come from retail investors. Another 1,757 bids were submitted through the 
“WRH institutional”, “WRH Middle Markets”, and “Co-Managers” channels, coming from 
institutional investors. We were not able to assign another 9,957 bids, representing about 25% of 
the demand in number of bids and in dollar value, to one of these two groups of investors. We use 
the following rule to allocate these bids to institutions or retail investors: if the dollar value 
(number of shares multiplied by bid price) of the bid is more than $50,000, which corresponds to 
the 90
th percentile of the distribution of retail bid values and the 30
th percentile of the distribution 
of institutional bid values, we assign the bid to the institutional investors group. If the dollar 
value of the bid is less than $15,000, which corresponds to the 75
th percentile of the distribution 
of retail bid values and the 10
th percentile of the distribution of institutional bid values, we assign 
the bid to the retail investors group. Using this procedure, we have 32,353 retail bids, 2,889 
institutional bids, and 2,328 bids that we cannot assign to one of the two groups of investors. 
Table 1, Panel B reports summary statistics on bids. The average IPO in our sample 
received 1,977 individual bids, 1,702 coming from retail investors, 152 from institutions. The 
total number of bids is significantly larger than in Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) and Jenkinson 
and Jones (2004) who report averages of 411 and 205 bids per deal, respectively. However, their 
data must contain almost only institutional bids because bookbuilt deals are virtually closed to 
retail investors, while ours contain a large fraction of retail bids. Furthermore, in bookbuilt deals  
 
11
like in the Cornelli-Goldreich sample, a given institution typically submits only one indication of 
interest, frequently without specifying a price. With auctions, a given institution may submit 
multiple bids at different prices -- In our sample, institutions submit about 2.5 bids (at different 
prices) on average when they participate in an IPO. 
The number of bids varies considerably across IPOs. The deal with the largest number of 
bids had 13,504 bids (12,857 from retail investors, 647 from institutions), while the deal with the 
smallest number of bids received only 75 bids (52 from retail investors, 22 from institutions, and 
one bid that we could not allocate to retail or institutional). In terms of bid size, the average 
institutional bid is about 57 times as large in dollar value as the average retail bid ($2.6 million vs. 
$44,700). Scaled by the size of the IPO, the average institutional bid represents approximately 
0.6% of total demand, which is in line with the numbers reported in Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) 
and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) for bookbuilt IPOs. The median oversubscription ratio (total 
shares bid for relative to shares issued) is 1.82, with a range of slightly more than one to more 
than five. This is less than in Cornelli and Goldreich (2003), who report an average 
oversubscription ratio of 9.1. However, with bookbuilt IPOs, indications of interest are “soft”, 
and on hot deals it is common for investors to ask for many more shares than they expect to be 
allocated.  
On average, retail investors account for 80.3% of the winning bids but receive only 13% of 
the shares sold in the auction, due to the smaller size of their bids. Thus, even though auctioned 
IPOs are open to retail investors, they are effectively dominated by institutions, like traditional 
bookbuilt IPOs. In that respect, U.S. auctioned IPOs differ from their Taiwanese counterparts, in 
which retail investors receive about 80% of the shares sold on average (Chiang, Qian and 
Sherman, 2008).  
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Table 1, Panel C reports statistics on pricing and aftermarket performance of the 19 
auctioned IPOs. The average IPO is priced approximately 10% below the midpoint of its price 
range, 9% (19%) below the demand-weighted average institutional (retail) bid price, and 
discounted by 4.5% relative to the auction clearing price.
10 Seven deals were discounted, and 12 
were priced at their clearing price. The average first-day return is 13.8%. This is comparable to 
average IPO underpricing in the U.S. in 2001-2007 (12%), but significantly lower than average 
IPO underpricing in 1999 and 2000 (71% and 56.2%, respectively). Median underpricing, 
however, is close to 0. The difference between the median and the mean is due to one outlier, 
Andover.net, which had a first day return of 252%.
11 When we drop this observation, the average 
initial return decreases to 0.6%. Three- and twelve-month Nasdaq-adjusted returns are slightly 
negative on average (-2.0% and -2.7%, respectively), and exhibit very large variance.
12 This is 
similar to the results of many studies of long-term post-IPO performance in and outside the 
United States. 
 
5. Bidding and the Potential for Free-Riding 
 
Investors who receive shares in auctioned IPOs all pay the same price regardless of their 
bid. This uniform-price feature gives investors an incentive to place market orders in order to free 
                                                 
10 We use the actual number of shares sold in the IPO to compute the clearing price. 
11 Andover.net was the first Linux operating system company to go public. Its initial public offering occurred on 
December 8, 1999, one day before that of its competitor, VA Linux, which used the bookbuilding method and had a 
697% first-day return. 
12 Two firms (Andover.net and Nogatech) were delisted before the first anniversary of their IPO. Their 12-month 
performance is calculated at their delisting date.  
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ride on the valuation homework of other investors, and to benefit from the possible underpricing 
of the IPO. While actual market orders are not permitted in auctioned IPOs, investors can submit 
quasi market orders by placing bids at very high prices. If free riding were widespread in 
auctioned IPOs, it might result in uninformative demand curves and mispriced shares. 
For investors with large bids, such as institutions, the incentive to free ride is tempered by 
the concern that their bid might push up the auction clearing price. Thus, auctioned IPO investors 
face an ecological tradeoff. All would like to free ride on each other’s information. But only retail 
investors can safely do so – their small bids are unlikely to move up the price. Accordingly we 
expect retail investors to be much more likely to place high bids than institutional investors. 
The IPO issuer has to refile with the SEC if changes in price or quantity will alter realized 
proceeds by more than 20% relative to the initial prospectus. Hence, an investor bidding at a 
price that exceeds the top of the price range by more than 20% is almost certain to receive shares. 
Thereafter we define such bids as “high bids.” 
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
Table 2, Panel A confirms that retail investors are more prone to place high bids. 
Averaging across deals, 9.7% of bids placed by retail investors were high, vs. 6% for institutions 
when the percentages are computed as the number of bids (when the percentages are computed in 
dollar value, the percentages are 16.5% for retail vs. 6.5% for institutional bids). These 
percentages are quite variable across deals, raising the next question of which deal characteristics 
are associated with high bidding behavior. 
Table 2, Panel B presents the results of logit regressions of the probability of placing a high 
bid as a function of deal and investor characteristics. The unit of observation for these regressions 
is a bid, and the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the bid is high (i.e., at a  
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price that exceeds the top of the price range by more than 20%), and zero otherwise. Consistent 
with the univariate results, retail investors are more likely to place high bids than institutional 
investors. Fixing the explanatory variables at their means, the baseline probability of a retail 
investor bidding high is 6%, vs. 2% for an institutional investor. 
Institutional investors making larger bid sizes were less likely to bid high: for them a one 
standard deviation increase in Log(Bid Size) is associated with about one percentage point 
decrease in the probability of a high bid. This finding supports the idea that institutional investors 
making large bids are concerned that their bids might raise the offering price. 
The concern of institutional investors that their bid might increase the clearing price should 
be most prevalent for the largest bid sizes. In the median deal the 90
th percentile institutional bid 
is about ten times the size of the median institutional bid and represents about five percent of total 
demand. Thus, the median institutional bidder is unlikely to affect the IPO price – but the largest 
(90
th percentile) institutional bidders are likely to affect it. To check this intuition we split 
institutional bids into bid size deciles, and we compute the mean percentage of high bids in each 
decile. Figure 1 reports our results. The average percentage of high bids is significantly higher in 
the smallest bid size deciles which contain bids from small institutions, and as expected, it drops 
sharply in the highest bid size deciles. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
Interestingly, retail investors making larger bids are more likely to bid high: A one standard 
deviation increase in Log(Bid Size) is associated with a two percentage point increase in the 
probability of a high bid (Table 2, Panel B, column 2). One explanation may be that retail  
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investors are more driven by sentiment
13 and that bullish retail investor sentiment translates into 
both higher prices and higher quantities. 
The probability for institutions (retail investors) to submit a high bid also increases by 
about fifteen (twelve) percentage points when the deal has been repriced with an increased price 
range. This suggests that investors expect such repriced deals to perform well on the aftermarket, 
as is the case with bookbuilt deals, and place quasi-market orders to take advantage of this short-
term performance. 
We also observe a time trend. We introduce an explanatory variable named Deal Rank, 
equal to 1 for the first deal, 2 for the second deal, etc. Both institutional and retail investors were 
more likely to bid high in the early WR Hambrecht deals: A one standard deviation increase in 
the  Deal Rank variable is associated with a seven (six) percentage point decrease in the 
probability of a high bid for institutional (retail) investors. There are several interpretations for 
this finding. Perhaps investors in the early WR Hambrecht auctions expected high levels of 
underpricing that are typical of bookbuilt offerings, and may have tried to obtain “bargain” shares 
by bidding high in early deals. This tactic may have then had less appeal as investors realized that 
the underpricing in IPO auctions is smaller, by design, than in bookbuilt deals. Another 
possibility is that WR Hambrecht itself became more selective over time as to which investors it 
marketed IPOs to, and succeeded in attracting investors with more information, and more 
willingness to place informative bids. 
It could also be that the link between Deal Rank and high bidding is not driven by bidders’ 
behavior, but rather by WR Hambrecht’s (and the issuer’s) choice of the price range. For example, 
suppose that the issuer chose a low price range on a deal. That would translate mechanically into 
more high bids for that IPO, since we define high bids relative to the price range. One could 
                                                 
13 Dorn (2007).  
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imagine that WR Hambrecht chose excessively low price ranges in its early deals, lacking pricing 
experience and preferring to err on the conservative side. But if this effect explained why 
investors placed more high bids in early deals, we should probably also see fewer low bids in 
early deals. In fact, if we define a low bid as one placed at a price below the midpoint of the filing 
range, we see no correlation between Deal Rank and Fraction of Low Bids in Deal. Moreover, if 
the “cautious price range” explanation above were driving our results on high bids, we would 
think that a greater Fraction of Low Bids in Deal should be associated with a smaller probability 
of a high bid. In fact, the estimated coefficient on Fraction of Low Bids in Deal is positive. 
Another possibility is that WR Hambrecht planned excessively narrow price ranges in 
some deals – mechanically driving up the number of high bids. If this were true, we would expect 
a positive coefficient on the Fraction of Low Bids in Deal in the logit regression. We find that the 
coefficient estimate is positive and statistically different from zero for institutions only (column 
1). This suggests that institutions submit more high bids when the price range is too narrow 
relative to the pricing uncertainty of the deal. 
We have found that free riding does occur in auctioned IPOs, mostly by retail investors 
placing small bids. A natural question is whether such free riding derails the auctioned IPO 
process, for instance by deterring the participation of informed investors, or by making the 
demand curves uninformative. We now turn to these issues. 
 
6. Investor participation 
 
If too few investors decide to acquire information and participate in the offering, the IPO 
price might be far from the firm’s aftermarket price, and the firm may also suffer low aftermarket  
 
17
liquidity. Chemmanur and Liu (2006) and Sherman (2005) compare auctions vs. other IPO 
mechanisms and reach these conclusions from a theoretical perspective. Chemmanur and Liu 
(2006) argue that unlike in fixed-priced IPOs, in which the price is set before investors decide to 
acquire information, informational rents obtained by costly information acquisition are competed 
away in an auction. Sherman (2005) compares auctions with bookbuilt IPOs in which the 
underwriter is free to choose the IPO price and to allocate shares. This freedom theoretically 
allows the underwriter to reward informed investors through underpriced shares in order to 
induce them to acquire information. Therefore, in bookbuilt offerings, the underwriter can ensure 
that collectively, investors acquire the optimal amount of information. On the contrary, in 
auctioned IPOs, the underwriter does not control the amount of information production, which 
makes the outcome of the offering more uncertain. 
Table 1 suggests that investor participation, measured by the overall level of 
oversubscription, is quite variable. We now explore the determinants of investor participation. 
We make a distinction between institutional and retail participation, because the willingness and 
ability of these two types of investors to generate information and the factors that influence their 
decision to participate in an IPO may differ. 
If participation depends on costly information acquisition, then it should be higher when 
the IPO is less subject to information asymmetry, which should be the case for larger IPOs. Over 
time, investors may also learn about the OpenIPO process and fine tune the cost/benefit analysis 
of participation in auctioned IPOs, so we also include Deal Rank, the time rank of the deal, in our 
tests. Investors’ willingness to participate in IPOs may also increase with stronger IPO market 
conditions (see Derrien, 2005, and Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist, 2006) so we include a 
measure of market conditions in the regressions. Our IPO Market Conditions variable is the 
weighted average of the percentage of IPOs (in the entire population of U.S. IPO) that were  
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priced above the midpoint of the price range in the 3 months preceding the IPO we are 
considering. The weight is 3 for the most recent month, 2 for the second-most recent month, and 
1 for the third-most recent month. 
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
Table 3 reports analyses of institutional and retail participation in panels A and B, 
respectively. The unit of observation is the deal (N=19). In both panels, investor participation is 
the dependent variable, and we measure it as oversubscription, using the number of shares 
announced in the initial filing, as well as the final number of shares announced. 
The size of the deal is by far the main driver of both institutional and retail participation. 
The coefficient on the Log(proceeds) variable is statistically significant at the 1% level for 
institutional participation, and at the 5% level for retail participation. A 10% increase in the 
proceeds is associated with an increase of 16 percentage points in institutional oversubscription 
and three percentage points in retail oversubscription, which is economically significant 
compared with the average oversubscription ratio of 2.26 reported in Table 1. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that more information is produced in larger IPOs because 
information is relatively less costly to acquire for larger, more visible firms. None of the other 
explanatory variables are consistently significant in all regressions. 
Interestingly, the R
2 is quite high in all regressions (62% and 51% in institutional 
participation regressions, 53% and 47% in retail participation tests), and it drops dramatically (to 
4% to 8%) when we exclude Log(proceeds) from the tests. This suggests that while participation 
is highly variable, it is also quite predictable using firm and IPO characteristics known before the 
deal, especially deal size.  
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In Table 4, we examine the decision to participate in auctioned IPOs at the investor level, 
using our ability to track institutional investors over time in the most recent sixteen deals 
completed by WR Hambrecht. In these tests, the unit of observation is an investor/IPO pair. For 
each investor/IPO pair, participation is an indicator variable equal to one if the investor decides to 
bid in the IPO, and zero otherwise. We identify 570 institutional investors. 402 of them 
participate in only one IPO, 145 in two to four IPOs, and 23 in five IPOs or more. 
In these investor-level tests, we use the same set of explanatory variables as in the deal-
level tests, as well as variables measuring whether the same investor participated in earlier IPOs, 
whether it received shares in previous deals, and how these shares performed in the aftermarket.
14 
Kaustia and Knüpfer (2007) found that individual investors are more likely to participate in IPOs 
if past bookbuilt IPOs in which they participated had better aftermarket performance, consistent 
with a theory of reinforcement learning. We might observe the same effect with institutions in 
auctioned IPOs. Finally, we include in the list of explanatory variables Raised Price Dummy 
(respectively, Lowered Price Dummy), an indicator variable equal to one if the price range was 
raised (respectively, lowered) during the IPO process, because a change in the price range may 
influence an investor’s participation decision.  
[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
Table 4 confirms that investors are more likely to participate in larger IPOs. They are also 
more likely to participate in the earlier auctioned IPOs. This may be because investors learned 
over time that the gains from being informed are not as large in auctions as in bookbuilt IPOs. Or 
perhaps in early deals investors expected IPOs to be priced at a discount and realized that in most 
                                                 
14 These tests are limited by the fact that we cannot track investors in the very first deals and investors that placed 
their bids through selling group members.   
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cases they were not. The positive link between IPO Market Conditions and the probability of 
participation (in four out of six specifications) suggests that investors are more inclined to 
participate in an IPO when they expect it to be “hot”. 
Investor learning also seems to play a significant role in the decision to participate in an 
auctioned IPO. Institutional investors are more likely to participate in an auctioned IPO when 
they have participated in previous auctioned IPOs (specification 2), and when they have received 
shares in previous auctioned IPOs (specification 4). Conditional on participating in past IPOs, 
institutional investors are also more likely to participate when the previous IPOs in which they 
did participate had higher initial returns (specifications 3 and 5). The effect is significant 
statistically and economically. A one-standard deviation increase in the average 10-day return of 
past auctioned IPOs in which institutional investors participated increases their probability of 
participating in a given IPO by about two percentage points relative to an unconditional 
probability of about 8% (specification 5). Thus, past experience with the IPO mechanism, and 
success with it, are important ingredients in the decision of institutional investors to participate in 
an auctioned IPO. 
This section suggests that investor participation in auctioned IPOs is primarily a function of 
deal size. As deal size is known to all before the IPO goes through, we interpret this finding to 
mean that while variable across deals, investor participation is largely predictable. Thus the fact 
that auctioned IPOs allow less role for the underwriter to drum up demand among investors need 
not be a concern. 
 




The elasticity of the demand curve measures the degree of consensus among investors 
about the price of the IPO. Like others before us,
 15 we interpret it as a measure of valuable 
pricing information contained in investors’ bids: In a common value auction setting, if investors 
have access to more precise valuation information, their bids will be closer to each other. 
(Investors’ bids might also exhibit more consensus if they herd. We consider this possibility 
below, and find no support for it, at least among institutional investors.) 
[Insert Figure 2 about here.] 
Figure 2 shows the demand curve for one of our sample IPOs. Most of the demand is 
within a fairly narrow price band, indicating a high elasticity. We construct several measures of 
elasticity as shown in Table 5, some following studies of bookbuilt IPOs, others more suited to 
auctioned IPOs. Liu et al. (2001) and Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) measure elasticity as the 
relative change in the number of shares demanded when the price is increased by 1% above the 
IPO price. Kandel et al. (1999) measure it as the relative quantity change when the price rises by 
one New Israeli Shekel. We construct similar measures, as well as elasticities computed at the 
clearing price. We also compute elasticities separately for institutional and retail demand in 
addition to the overall elasticities. If institutional investors bring more information than retail 
investors into their bids, we would expect the institutional investor elasticity to be higher than the 
retail elasticity. 
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
Table 5 reports the median elasticity across our 19 deals using alternative measures of 
elasticity. Demand elasticity is somewhat higher than in Kandel et al.’s (1999) study of Israeli 
auctioned IPOs and Liu et al.’s (2001) study of Taiwanese auctioned IPOs – the comparable 
                                                 
15 Cornelli and Goldreich (2003), Kandel et al. (1999), Liu et al. (2007).  
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elasticity measure has a median of 34.4 in our sample vs. 21 and 20 in theirs, respectively. 
Demand elasticity in our sample is also much higher than in Cornelli and Goldreich’s (2003) 
study of European bookbuilt IPOs – the comparable elasticity measure has a median of 34.6 in 
our sample vs. 3.6 in theirs. We interpret the high elasticities in our sample as evidence that WR 
Hambrecht’s auction system is successful at eliciting information from investors in the U.S. 
environment.  
As the second row of Table 5 attests, the elasticity of institutional demand is markedly 
greater than that of retail demand, regardless of the measure of elasticity we use. The median 
ratio of institutional to retail elasticity is above three for most of our elasticity measures, giving 
credence to the notion that institutional bids are more informative than retail bids. This result is in 
line with the findings of Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2008) for Taiwanese auctioned IPOs. 
The bottom rows of Table 5 show that overall elasticity is almost perfectly correlated with 
institutional elasticity. The correlation of retail demand elasticity with overall elasticity is much 
weaker. The contribution of institutional investors to the information content of the demand curve 
overwhelms any “noise” introduced by retail investors into the bidding process. 
[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
Table 6 provides more support for this idea, correlating institutional demand with the 
elasticity of the demand curve. We report correlations between institutional investor participation 
measures and elasticities. The pattern is clear: greater institutional participation is associated with 
greater elasticity. In the first row of the table, the correlation between institutional 
oversubscription and elasticity of demand is positive for eight out of nine measures of demand 
elasticity (and statistically significantly at conventional levels for five measures). In the second 
row of Table 6, we measure institutional participation as the percentage of institutional demand.  
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The correlation between institutional participation and demand elasticity is positive for all 
measures of elasticity, and statistically significant for seven of them. These results show that 
higher institutional participation is associated with more information revelation not only when we 
consider institutional participation alone (in the first row of Table 6), but also when we measure 
institutional participation relative to retail participation (in the second row of Table 6). They 
confirm that institutional bids are informative and retail bids are not (or, at least, much less so). 
We have seen in Table 3 that participation is higher in larger auctioned IPOs, and we 
concluded that information production is higher in larger deals. If this interpretation is correct, 
then demand elasticity should also be higher in larger deals. The third row of Table 6 confirms 
this hypothesis: The correlation between Log(proceeds) and elasticity is significantly positive 
with five (out of nine) measures of elasticity. This confirms our previous findings that more 
information is produced in larger deals. 
So far we have interpreted greater consensus among investors as synonymous with a 
greater amount of information incorporated in the demand curve. An alternative view is that 
greater consensus results from collective investor error: Investors might all rely on the same 
erroneous pieces of information, i.e., they might be herding. If greater consensus among investors 
truly reflects a better information environment, higher demand elasticity should be associated 
with  less aftermarket price variability. Under the “collective error” view, higher demand 
elasticity should be associated with more aftermarket price variability, so we next try to 
distinguish between these two possibilities. 
[Insert Table 7 about here.] 
In Table 7, we regress aftermarket variability on measures of institutional and retail 
demand elasticities. We measure aftermarket variability as the absolute value of the three-month  
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adjusted stock price performance.
16 For almost all measures of elasticity, we find that higher 
institutional demand elasticity is associated with less aftermarket variability. This finding is 
consistent with the view that institutional demand contributes useful valuation information to the 
pricing of the IPO. By contrast, higher retail elasticity is almost always associated with higher 






The spirit of the IPO auction process is to “let the market speak.” However, WR 
Hambrecht’s auction process has explicitly allowed for discretion in the setting of the IPO price. 
We have seen that in seven IPO auctions, the IPO price reflected a discount from the clearing 
price, leaving 12 auctions where the auction clearing price was also the chosen IPO price. We 
want to examine empirically what determines whether the IPO was priced at a discount to the 
auction clearing price. 
One possibility is that WR Hambrecht and the issuer attempted to shield the IPO price from 
the influence of high bids, when they felt that the demand curve contained “froth.” Such actions 
would attempt to mitigate the influence of high bids on the IPO price. 
[Insert Table 8 about here.] 
Table 8 suggests that high bids have much less influence on the IPO price than on the 
clearing price. We regress Clearing Price Relative (equal to the clearing price minus the midpoint 
                                                 
16 The results are similar if we calculate aftermarket variability over different horizons. 
17 For a comparative analysis of aftermarket variability in bookbuilt vs. auctioned IPOs, see Pettway et al. (2008).  
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of the price range, divided by the midpoint of the price range – column 1) and IPO Price Relative 
(equal to the IPO price minus the midpoint of the price range, divided by the midpoint of the 
price range – column 2) on the percentage of high bids and control variables. In column 1, the 
coefficient on Fraction of high bids in Deal is strongly positive and significant. In column 2, it is 
not statistically significant. This suggests that high bids do influence the clearing price, but not 
the chosen IPO price. These results are consistent with WR Hambrecht and the issuer “buffering” 
the IPO price from the influence of high bids. 
We test the “buffering” hypothesis more directly by examining the determinants of the 
discount. That is, if the issuer is concerned about overpricing, we should see a more likely, and a 
higher discount, when the clearing price is affected by high bids. For each deal we compute what 
the clearing price would have been if the issuer had discarded the high bids – high bids had an 
impact on the clearing price in five out of 19 deals. The issuer might also be hesitant about 
pricing the IPO at the clearing price when the elasticity of the demand curve is low, as that would 
suggest disagreement among investors. We find evidence consistent with both of these intuitions. 
[Insert Table 9 about here.] 
In Table 9 we report the results of Tobit regressions of the IPO discount on the Effect of 
High Bids on Clearing price (defined as the change in clearing price when high bids are excluded 
divided by the clearing price), demand elasticity, and control variables. Fixing the explanatory 
variables at their means, the baseline probability of a discount is 34%. A one standard deviation 
increase in the variable Effect of High Bids on Clearing Price is associated with a 56 percentage 
point increase in the probability of a discount, and a two percentage point increase in the 
expected discount. A one standard deviation increase in Elasticity is associated with a 44 
percentage point fall in the probability of a discount and a one percentage point reduction in the  
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expected discount: IPO auction issuers were more comfortable “letting the market speak” when 





Next, we explore the flipping behavior of auctioned IPO investors, i.e., their decision to 
sell the shares they received in the IPO in the month following the offering. Flipping is a serious 
concern for issuers and underwriters, especially in cold deals, in which it can put downward 
pressure on the aftermarket price. Krigman, Shaw and Womack (1999) and Aggarwal (2003) 
have analyzed flipping in bookbuilt IPOs, but no such evidence exists for auctions. Bankers often 
argue that the flexibility of the bookbuilding mechanism allows underwriters to put IPO shares in 
the “good hands” of long-term investors, that is, to avoid flippers. Auctions do not offer this 
flexibility to the underwriter, and might therefore be more subject to flipping. On the other hand, 
if auctions do a good job of placing the shares in the hands of investors who value them the most, 
then flipping should be less prevalent for IPO auctions. 
We have flipping data for 390 institutional investors and 36 retail investors in 11 deals. In 
323 of the 390 institutional investor observations, the investor placed its bid through WR 
Hambrecht and can be identified by name. In the remaining cases, investors placed their bids 
through selling group members, and the flipping data is aggregated at the selling group member 
level. On average, institutional (retail) investors flip 27.6% (26.5%) of the shares they receive in 
the month following the offering. These numbers are very close to those reported by Aggarwal  
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(2003) for bookbuilt IPOs. She finds that in the two days following the offering institutional 
(retail) investors flip 26% (24%) of their shares on average.
18 
[Insert Table 10 about here.] 
Is there a link between investor flipping and initial return? In the 11 IPOs for which we 
observe flipping, six had 10-day returns equal to or below zero, and five had strictly positive 10-
day returns. Table 10, Panel A reports the average flipping ratio of institutional and retail 
investors depending on initial return. This table shows that both institutions and retail investors 
flip a much larger fraction of their shares in cold deals: Institutions flip on average 33.6% (19.7%) 
of their shares when initial return is negative (positive). For retail investors, the effect is even 
more pronounced. They flip more than half of their shares (52.5%) in cold deals, and only 7.9% 
on average when initial return is positive.
19 This result is at odds with the findings of Aggarwal 
(2003), who shows that in bookbuilt IPOs, flipping is significantly higher in hot deals than in 
cold deals. 
What can explain this significant difference between auctions and bookbuilding? We 
surmise that the discretion underwriters enjoy in bookbuilt IPOs allows them to punish investors 
who flip their shares in cold deals (when flipping is presumably the most detrimental to the issuer 
and the underwriter) by excluding them from future offerings. In a multi-period game setting in 
which investors benefit from a long-term relationship with the underwriter, investors may 
respond to this threat by reluctantly refraining from flipping cold deals. In an auction, the 
                                                 
18 Since we measure flipping over one month after the IPO (rather than Aggarwal’s (2003) two days) our flipping 
numbers are probably upwardly biased relative to hers. 
19 In most cases, the median investor does not flip any of his shares. This is because the distribution of the flipping 
ratio is bi-modal: most investors flip either all their shares or no shares at all.  
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underwriter cannot discriminate among investors, and therefore cannot prevent investors from 
flipping their shares in cold deals. There are other ways to discourage flipping. One of them is to 
impose penalties on syndicate members whose investors flipped their shares. The OpenIPO 
mechanism also allows explicitly WR Hambrecht to exclude investors from the bidding process. 
However, these alternative mechanisms are probably less efficient anti-flipping tools than 
allocation discrimination. Moreover, as a niche underwriter, WR Hambrecht’s bargaining power 
with large institutional investors and its ability to discourage them from flipping was in this 
period probably relatively limited. 
Investor-level flipping data for 323 institutional investors allows further analysis. If IPO 
auctions succeed in placing shares with the investors who value them the most, and if bids reflect 
private valuations, investors with high bids should flip less. We find support for this joint 
hypothesis in Table 10, Panel B, where we analyze flipping decisions in a multiple regression 
framework. We construct the variable Institution’s Average Bid Price in the IPO, equal to the 
weighted average price of the bids submitted by the investor (where the weight is the number of 
shares in the bid) minus the midpoint of the price range. The coefficient on this variable in the 
regression is negative with a p-value of 0.04, suggesting that for institutions high price bids 
reflected truly high private valuations, and not just an attempt to receive share allocations. 
Institutional investors also flipped more in earlier deals. Consistent with the univariate 
evidence in Panel A, Panel B of Table 10 shows that investors flip less when the initial return is 
positive. The flipping ratio decreases by about 15 percentage points when the 10-day return of the 
IPO is positive (p-value 0.01). Institutional investors also tend to flip more in larger deals, and to 
flip less when they received more shares. Perhaps institutions decided to flip their shares when 




10. Investor returns 
 
We have shown that institutional investors that participate in these auctions seem to be 
more informed than individuals, and contribute their information in their bids. In equilibrium, 
institutions should earn higher returns in auctioned IPOs to compensate them for the cost of their 
information. We find evidence consistent with this prediction: institutions stay away from “bad” 
deals (those with poor aftermarket performance), and participate more in “hot” deals (those that 
do well in the aftermarket).  
[Insert Figure 3 about here.] 
Figure 3 relates 10-day underpricing to the fraction of the IPO shares allocated to 
institutions. The figure shows that, with the exception of one outlier, Andover.net, which appears 
at the top of Figure 3, institutions get a bigger share of IPOs with smaller initial returns. If we 
ignore the outlier, Andover.net, the correlation between these two variables is 0.53 and is 
significant at the 5% level. The weighted average 10-day return of institutional vs. retail investors 
(the weight being the fraction of the shares received by each group of investors) is 8.5% for 
institutions vs. 5.4% for individuals. If we ignore Andover.net, we obtain average returns of 0.7% 
vs. -5.0%, respectively. Overall, the fact that institutional investors obtain a bigger share of the 
deals with the best aftermarket performance translates into their better average returns. This is 




                                                 
20 This result is consistent with the findings of Lin, Lee, and Liu (2007) and Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2008) for 





We study 19 auctioned IPOs that used WR Hambrecht’s OpenIPO auction mechanism 
between 1999 and 2007. Overall, we find that this mechanism allows the underwriter and the 
issuer to extract information. Bids posted at high prices indeed suggest that some investors 
(predominantly retail and small institutions, whose impact on the clearing price is limited) try to 
free-ride on the mechanism. Retail bids are less informative than institutional bids, but do not 
seem to affect the information-extraction mechanism enough to discourage institutional investors 
from participating. Demand in auctioned IPOs is quite elastic, suggesting that investors produce 
information and reveal it in the bidding process. The pricing flexibility offered by the mechanism 
allows the issuer to “buffer” against such free-riding by discounting the deal relative to the 
clearing price when more investors submit bids at high prices. We also find that overall, flipping 
is about as prevalent in auctions as in bookbuilt deals. However, unlike in bookbuilding, 
investors tend to flip their shares more in deals with low initial returns, perhaps because the 
absence of allocation discrimination prevents issuers from penalizing past flippers. Finally, we 
find that institutional investors, who provide more information, are somewhat rewarded by 
obtaining larger shares of the deals with higher initial returns. 
Overall, these results suggest that auctions are an effective alternative to traditional 
bookbuilding. A potential concern with our results might be that our sample only consists of 
successful deals. But the number of withdrawn auctioned IPOs over the 1999-2007 period – six – 
is in line with that reported by Dunbar and Foerster (2008) who find that 20% of IPOs were 
withdrawn in the 1985-2000 period in the U.S. Another concern is that issuers select their IPO 
mechanism, and we cannot exclude the possibility that issuing companies for which investors 
have more information are disproportionately represented in WR Hambrecht’s IPO auctions. Our  
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investor participation results suggest that some firms are better suited for auctioned IPOs than 
others, in particular large firms that are less subject to information asymmetry and that appeal 
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This table reports summary statistics on the 19 deals and 37,570 individual bids in our sample. 
In Panel A, Proceeds are equal to the IPO price multiplied by the number of shares sold, excluding 
overallotment shares. Firm age is the number of years since incorporation at IPO date. 
In Panel B, Institutional (retail) demand per bid is the number of shares demanded multiplied by the 
bid price for each institutional (retail) bid. Bids at different prices from the same investor are counted as 
separate bids. Oversubscription is the number of shares demanded at all prices divided by the number 
of shares sold, excluding the overallotment option. Retail allocation is the fraction of the IPO shares 
received by retail investors. 
In Panel C, IPO price relative to midpoint of range is the IPO price minus the midpoint of the price 
range, divided by the midpoint of the price range. IPO price relative to average institutional (retail) 
price is the IPO price minus the demand-weighted average institutional (retail) bid price, divided by the 
demand-weighted average institutional (retail) bid price. Discount relative to market clearing price is 
the clearing price minus the IPO price, divided by the IPO price. Rationing is the number of shares 
offered to the public divided by the number of shares investors bid for at prices equal to or above the 
IPO price. 1-day return and 10-day return are unadjusted returns over 1- and 10-day periods following 
the IPO, respectively. 3-month and 12-month Nasdaq-adjusted returns are adjusted using the return of 
the Nasdaq index over the same period. In panels A, B and C, the last column contains averages for 
samples of bookbuilt IPOs (when available). Numbers in the last columns of panels A and C come from 
Jay Ritter’s website and are for U.S. bookbuilt IPOs. Numbers in the last column of Panel B come from 
Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) or Jenkinson and Jones (2004), and are for samples of European 
bookbuilt IPOs. The source (CG, or JJ) is in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Firm and IPO characteristics 
    Number of auctioned IPOs in our sample  Total number of 
IPOs in the U.S. 
IPO year  1999 3  476 
  2000 1  381 
  2001 2  80 
  2002 1  66 
  2003 2  63 
  2004 1  174 
  2005 5  161 
  2006 2  156 
  2007 2  158 
 
Mean Median  Min  Max  N 
Averages for the 
entire universe 
of U.S. IPOs in 
1999-2007 
Proceeds ($million)  107 33.6  10.5  1,200  19  188 
Firm age  11.7 7 1 30  19  8 




Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Bids 




Number of bids per deal  1,977  1,080  75  13,504  19  411 (CG), 205 (JJ) 
Number of institutional bids per deal  152 92  22 647  19  -- 
Number of retail bids per deal  1,702 862  52 12,857  19  -- 
Institutional demand per bid ($,000)  2,559  320  0.2  128,000  2,889   
Retail demand per bid ($,000)  44.7  5.1  0  48,200  32,353   
Oversubscription  2.26  1.82  1.02  5.28  19  9.1 (CG), 10 (JJ) 
Fraction of winning bids  82.1%  93.0%  26.7%  98.7%  19  -- 
Retail allocation  13.0%  12.0%  3.5%  28.9%  19  -- 
           
 
Panel C: Pricing and aftermarket performance 
  Mean Median  Min  Max  N 
IPO price relative to midpoint of range  -9.8% -12.5%  -33.3% 9.1%  19 
IPO price relative to average institutional price  -8.9% -8.4%  -25.0% 8.6%  19 
IPO price relative to average retail price  -18.8% -16.9% -59.6%  4.7%  19 
Discount relative to market clearing price  4.5% 0  0  33.3%  19 
Rationing  73.5% 80.9% 27.5%  100.0% 19 
1-day return  13.8% 0.6% -21.6%  252.1% 19 
10-day return  8.8% 1.8%  -35.2%  167.7%  19 
3-month Nasdaq-adjusted return  -2.0% -9.5%  -61.4%  103.7% 19 
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Table 2 
Determinants of high bids 
The sample consists of 2,889 institutional bids and 31,446 retail bids in 19 deals. We define a high bid as one made at 
a price that exceeds the top of the price range by more than 20%. 
In row 1 of Panel A we compute the percentage of high bids by dividing the number of high bids by the number of 
bids in each deal. In row 2 of Panel A we compute the percentage of high bids submitted by each investor class by 
dividing the dollar value of high bids by the dollar value of all bids in each deal. 
In Panel B, we report logit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bid is high and 
zero otherwise. Log(Bid Size) is the log of the number of shares for that bid. Deal Rank is the rank among WR 
Hambrecht auctioned IPOs (1 for the first IPO, etc.). IPO Market Conditions is the weighted average of the 
percentage of IPOs that were priced above the midpoint of the price range in the 3 months preceding the IPO we are 
considering. The weight is 3 for the most recent month, 2 for the second-most recent month, and 1 for the third-most 
recent month. Log(proceeds) is the log of the dollar size of the offering, excluding overallotment shares. Fraction of 
Low Bids in Deal is the number of low bids (priced below the midpoint of the price range) divided by the number of 
bids in the deal (excluding high bids). Raised Price Dummy is equal to one if the top of the price range was raised 
between the first filing and the IPO, and zero otherwise. Lowered Price Dummy is equal to one if the top of the price 
range was lowered between the first filing and the IPO, and zero otherwise. For continuous explanatory variables we 
report the change in the probability of a high bid associated with a one standard deviation change in the independent 
variable, assuming that the other variables are fixed at their sample mean. For dummy explanatory variables we report 
the change in the probability of a high bid as the dummy variable goes from zero to one. We report the p-values 
(calculated with clustering at the IPO level) in parentheses below the marginal effect numbers. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
Panel A: Percentage of high bids for institutions vs. retail investors 
   Institutions  Retail 
In number of bids  Mean percentage across deals  6.0%  9.7% 
Standard deviation of percentage across deals  11.9%  10.7% 
In dollar volume  Mean percentage across deals  6.5%  16.5% 
Standard deviation of percentage across deals  15.0%  18.2% 
 
Panel B: Logit regressions 
 
Change in the probability of a high bid associated with a one standard deviation 
increase in the independent variable 
 Institutions  Retail 
Log(Bid Size)  -0.014***  0.021*** 
 (0.00)  (0.01) 
Deal Rank  -0.069***  -0.062*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
IPO Market Conditions  0.000  -0.000 
 (0.87)  (0.23) 
Log(proceeds) 0.039**  -0.005 
 (0.01)  (0.89) 
Fraction of Low Bids in Deal  0.027***  0.016 
 (0.00)  (0.34) 
  Change in the probability of a high bid as the explanatory variable goes from 0 to 1 
Raised Price Dummy  0.146*  0.124*** 
 (0.09)  (0.01) 
Lowered Price Dummy  0.078  0.012 
  (0.13) (0.63) 
Baseline probability of bidding high  2%  6% 
Pseudo R² 0.30  0.11 
N 2,889  31,446    
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Table 3 
Determinants of investor participation at the deal level 
This table reports OLS regressions of investor participation on the following explanatory variables: Deal Rank is the 
rank among WR Hambrecht auctioned IPOs (1 for the first IPO, etc.). IPO Market Conditions is the weighted average 
of the percentage of IPOs that were priced above the midpoint of the price range in the 3 months preceding the IPO 
we are considering. The weight is 3 for the most recent month, 2 for the second-most recent month, and 1 for the 
third-most recent month. Log(proceeds) is the log of the dollar size of the offering, excluding overallotment shares. In 
Panel A, the dependent variables are two measures of institutional investor participation: Institutional 
oversubscription (initial filing) is the number of shares demanded by institutions (at all prices) divided by the number 
of shares offered by the issuer in the first IPO filing. Institutional oversubscription (final) is the number of shares 
demanded by institutions (at all prices) divided by the number of shares offered by the issuer in the IPO prospectus. In 
Panel B, the dependent variables are two measures of retail investor participation: Retail oversubscription (initial 
filing) is the total number of shares demanded by retail investors divided by the number of shares offered by the issuer 
in the first IPO filing. Retail oversubscription (final) is the total number of shares demanded by retail investors 
divided by the number of shares offered by the issuer in the final IPO prospectus. We report p-values in parentheses 
below the regression coefficients.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Panel A: Institutional participation 
  Dependent variable 
  Institutional oversubscription (initial filing)  Institutional oversubscription (final) 
Deal Rank  -0.066 -0.054 
  (0.23) (0.19) 
IPO Market Conditions  0.730 0.658 
  (0.34) (0.42) 
Log(proceeds)  1.566*** 0.942*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant  -25.034*** -14.360*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) 
R²  0.62 0.51 
R² when we replicate the tests 
without Log(proceeds)  0.08 0.04 
N  19 19 
 
Panel B: Retail participation 
 Dependent  variable 
  Retail oversubscription (initial filing) Retail  oversubscription  (final) 
Deal Rank  -0.021  -0.017 
 (0.14)  (0.13) 
IPO Market Conditions  0.393*  0.386* 
 (0.07)  (0.08) 
Log(proceeds) 0.330**  0.197** 
 (0.03)  (0.02) 
Constant -5.459**  -3.188** 
 (0.04)  (0.03) 
R²  0.53 0.47 
R² when we replicate the tests 
without Log(proceeds)  0.05 0.08 
N 19  19    
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Table 4 
Determinants of the probability of institutional participation at the investor level 
This table reports the results of logit regressions of institutional participation on explanatory variables. The sample consists of 9,120 
investor-deal observations from 16 deals for which institutional investor-level data is available. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the investor participated in the deal, and zero otherwise. Deal Rank is the rank among WR Hambrecht 
auctioned IPOs (1 for the first IPO, etc.). IPO Market Conditions is the weighted average of the percentage of IPOs that were priced 
above the midpoint of the price range in the 3 months preceding the IPO we are considering. The weight is 3 for the most recent 
month, 2 for the second-most recent month, and 1 for the third-most recent month. Log(proceeds) is the log of the dollar size of the 
offering, excluding overallotment shares. %Past participation is the number of previous IPO auctions in which this investor 
participated, divided by the number of previous IPOs for which investor participation is available. PastUP is the average 10-day return 
for the previous IPO auctions in which this investor participated. %PastPartAlloc is the number of previous IPO auctions in which this 
investor participated and received shares, divided by the number of previous IPOs for which investor participation is available. 
PastUPAlloc is the average 10-day return for the previous IPO auctions in which this investor participated and received shares. 
PastUPAll is the average 10-day return for all previous IPO auctions. Raised Price dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the top 
of the price range was raised between the first filing and the IPO, and zero otherwise. Lowered Price dummy is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the top of the price range was lowered between the first filing and the IPO, and zero otherwise.  
For continuous explanatory variables we report the change in the probability of participation associated with a one standard deviation 
change in the independent variable. For dummy explanatory variables we report the change in the probability of participation as the 
dummy variable goes from zero to one. We report the p-values (calculated with clustering at the IPO level) in parentheses below the 
marginal effect numbers. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.    
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Change in probability of participation associated with a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable 
Deal Rank  -0.022***  -0.023***  -0.057*** -0.023*** -0.053*** -0.028** 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
IPO Market Conditions  0.016***  0.015***  -0.008  0.015***  0.012  0.016*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.45) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) 
Log(proceeds)  0.062***  0.061***  0.063*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
%Past  participation    0.007*      
    (0.06)      
PastUP     0.018***       
     (0.00)       
%PastPartAlloc      0.006*    
       (0.10)     
PastUPAlloc      0.017***   
         (0.00)   
PastUPAll           -0.006 
           (0.41) 
  Change in probability of participation as the independent dummy variable goes from zero to one 
Raised Price Dummy  0.046  0.047  -0.019  0.046  -0.025  0.046 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.40) (0.21) (0.26) (0.18) 
Lowered  Price  Dummy  0.020 0.017  0.060*  0.018 0.058 0.020 
  (0.21) (0.34) (0.06) (0.32) (0.12) (0.24) 
Pseudo R²  0.15 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.15 
N  9,120 8,550 3,403 8,550 3,146 9,120 
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Table 5 
Demand curve elasticities 
This table reports measures of elasticity (one column per measure) for our sample of 19 auctioned IPOs. The first row of the table reports the 
definitions of our elasticity measures. Other rows report Spearman rank correlations between various measures of elasticity. We report the p-values 








Price goes up 





Price goes up 
10 cents above 
the IPO price 
Price goes up 
$1 above the 
IPO price 
Price goes from 
90% to 110% 
of the IPO 
price (arc 
elasticity) 







Price goes up 10 
cents above the 
clearing price 
(similar to 
Kandel et al. 
1999) 
Price goes up 
$1 above the 
clearing price 
Price goes from 






bottom to the 





















0.97*** 0.98*** 0.99*** 0.98*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.98*** 0.96*** 






0.56*** 0.54** 0.56*** 0.54**  0.48**  0.48** 0.71***  0.87***  0.29 
p-value  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.23    
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Table 6 
Institutional participation and demand elasticities 
This table reports correlations between different measures of elasticity (one column per measure) and different measures of institutional 
participation for our sample of 19 auctioned IPOs. The first row of the table reports the definitions of our elasticity measures. In the second row, 
investor participation is institutional oversubscription, the number of shares demanded by institutions at all prices divided by the number of shares 
sold, excluding the overallotment option. In the third row, investor participation is the dollar value of institutional demand at all prices, divided by 
the total dollar value of demand at all prices. In the fourth row, we report correlations between elasticity and the log of the dollar size of the 
offering. We report the p-values below the correlation coefficients. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Relative change 
in quantity of 
shares demanded 
when: 
Price goes up 
1% above the 
IPO price 
Price goes up 
10 cents 
above the IPO 
price 
Price goes up 
$1 above the 
IPO price 
Price goes from 
90% to 110% of 
the IPO price 
(arc elasticity)
Price goes up 
1% above the 
clearing price 




Price goes up 
$1 above the 
clearing price 
Price goes from 






bottom to the 






-0.122  0.137 0.762***  0.619*** 0.070 0.658***  0.781***  0.716*** 0.070 
p-value  0.62 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 
Correlation of 




0.429* 0.435* 0.429*  0.573***  0.368  0.232  0.432*  0.452**  0.454** 
p-value  0.07 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.34 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Correlation of 
elasticity with the 
size of the deal 
-0.302  -0.155 0.526**  0.448** -0.039 0.544**  0.551***  0.550*** 0.229 
p-value  0.21 0.53 0.02 0.05 0.87 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.35 
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Table 7 
Aftermarket stock price variability and demand elasticities 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of aftermarket stock price variability on measures of institutional and retail demand 
elasticity for the 19 auctioned IPOs in our sample using the following model: 
Aftermarket variabilityi = α0 + α1.Log(proceeds)i + α2.IPO market conditionsi + α3.institutional elasticityi + α4.retail elasticityi + ei 
We define aftermarket stock price variability as the absolute value of the three-month Nasdaq-adjusted stock performance relative to the 
offer price, in percent. Elasticities are defined in the first column. Log(proceeds) is the log of the dollar size of the offering, excluding 
overallotment shares. IPO Market Conditions is the weighted average of the percentage of IPOs that were priced above the midpoint of the 
price range in the 3 months preceding the IPO we are considering. The weight is 3 for the most recent month, 2 for the second-most recent 
month, and 1 for the third-most recent month. Heteroskedasticity-consistent p-values are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
  Dependent variable: Aftermarket stock price variability 
Log(proceeds)    -9.02  -7.18 -9.82* -4.34  -5.56 0.30 1.95 -1.77 -7.56 
    (0.16) (0.21) (0.06) (0.33) (0.31) (0.97) (0.82) (0.73) (0.20) 
IPO Market Conditions    -0.12 -0.10 -0.00 0.01 -0.10 0.02 0.12 0.08 -0.24 
   (0.62) (0.58) (0.99) (0.98) (0.72) (0.94) (0.70) (0.81) (0.45) 
Relative change in quantity of shares demanded when:     
Price goes up 1% 
above the IPO price 
Institutional  -0.61***               
(0.01)               
Retail  0.63**               
(0.02)               
Price goes up 10 cents 
above the IPO price 
Institutional   -0.43**              
  (0.02)           
Retail   0.58**              
  (0.03)           
Price goes up $1 
above the IPO price 
Institutional     -4.99***             
   (0.00)             
Retail     6.31***             
   (0.00)             
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Price goes from 90% 
to 110% of the IPO 
price (arc elasticity) 
Institutional       -7.67***           
     (0.00)           
Retail       7.04***           
     (0.00)           
Price goes up 1% 
above the clearing 
price 
Institutional         -0.69**         
       (0.01)         
Retail         0.65**         
       (0.02)         
Price goes up 10 cents 
above the clearing 
price 
Institutional           -0.47**       
         (0.02)       
Retail           0.72**       
         (0.04)       
Price goes up $1 
above the clearing 
price 
Institutional             -5.15**     
           (0.02)     
Retail             5.43**     
           (0.01)     
Price goes from 90% 
to 110% of the 
clearing price (arc 
elasticity) 
Institutional               -0.783**   
             (0.05)   
Retail               6.40**   
             (0.04)   
Price goes from the 
bottom to the top of 
the pricing range 
Institutional                 -1.56 
               (0.18) 
Retail                 7.03 
               (0.29) 
Constant 
  218.13* 180.35 221.47**  134.15  162.04  47.32  19.14  91.09  178.99* 
  (0.09) (0.11) (0.02) (0.10) (0.13) (0.71) (0.71) (0.32) (0.07) 
R²   0.43 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.39 0.36 0.32 0.37 0.11 
N   19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19    
  45
Table 8 
Determinants of the IPO price and the clearing price 
This table reports OLS regressions of the Clearing Price Relative and the IPO Price Relative 
on the Fraction of High Bids in Deal and control variables. The dependent variable in column 
1 is Clearing Price Relative, equal to the clearing price minus the midpoint of the price range, 
divided by the midpoint of the price range. The dependent variable in column 2 is IPO Price 
Relative, equal to the IPO price minus the midpoint of the price range, divided by the midpoint 
of the price range. IPO Market Conditions is the weighted average of the percentage of IPOs 
that were priced above the midpoint of the price range in the 3 months preceding the IPO we 
are considering. The weight is 3 for the most recent month, 2 for the second-most recent 
month, and 1 for the third-most recent month. Log(proceeds) is the log of the dollar size of the 
offering, excluding overallotment shares. Fraction of High Bids in Deal is the number of high 
bids (defined as exceeding the top of the price range by more than 20%), divided by the 
number of bids in the deal. Raised Price Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the top of 
the price range was raised between the first filing and the IPO, and zero otherwise. We report 
p-values in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 Dependent  variable 
  Clearing Price Relative  IPO Price Relative 
IPO Market Conditions  0.287**  0.256** 
 (0.02)  (0.04) 
Log(proceeds) 0.066  0.048 
 (0.12)  (0.32) 
Raised Price Dummy  0.058  0.019 
 (0.68)  (0.90) 
Fraction of High Bids in Deal  0.775***  0.120 
 (0.01)  (0.54) 
Constant -1.398*  -1.077 
 (0.08)  (0.22) 
R²  0.71 0.39 
N 19  19 
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Table 9 
Determinants of the IPO discount 
This table reports the results of a Tobit regression of the IPO discount on explanatory 
variables. The dependent variable is the relative discount defined as the clearing price minus 
the IPO price divided by the clearing price. Effect of High Bids on Clearing Price is the 
clearing price minus the clearing price when we exclude high bids (i.e., bids made at a price 
that exceeds the top of the price range by more than 20%), divided by the clearing price. IPO 
Market Conditions is the weighted average of the percentage of IPOs that were priced above 
the midpoint of the price range in the 3 months preceding the IPO we are considering. The 
weight is 3 for the most recent month, 2 for the second-most recent month, and 1 for the third-
most recent month. Log(proceeds) is the log of the dollar size of the offering, excluding 
overallotment shares. Deal Rank is the rank among WR Hambrecht auctioned IPOs (1 for the 
first IPO, etc.). We report the marginal effects on the probability of a discount, and on the 
expected discount (conditional on the discount being positive). We report p-values in 
parentheses below the marginal effects. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Marginal effect on the 
probability of discount of a one 
standard deviation change in the 
explanatory variable 
Marginal effect on the expected 
discount of a one standard 
deviation change in the 
explanatory variable 
 
Effect of High Bids on Clearing Price  0.56** 1.8%*** 
  (0.03) (0.01) 
Elasticity (relative change in quantity 
of shares demanded when price rises 





IPO Market Conditions  0.26 0.9% 
  (0.32) (0.28) 
Log(Proceeds)  0.25* 0.8%* 
  (0.10) (0.09) 
Deal Rank  0.29 0.9% 
  (0.25) (0.22) 
N  19 




Panel A reports mean and median flipping ratios across investors in five IPOs with positive 10-
day returns and six IPOs with 10-day returns equal to or below 0. For each investor, the flipping 
ratio is calculated as the number of shares flipped within a month of the IPO, divided by the 
number of shares received in the IPO. 
Panel B reports OLS regressions of flipping ratios on explanatory variables for 323 institutional 
investors in 11 auctioned IPOs. For each investor, the flipping ratio is calculated as the number 
of shares flipped within a month of the IPO, divided by the number of shares received in the 
IPO. Deal Rank is the rank among WR Hambrecht auctioned IPOs (1 for the first IPO, etc.). 
IPO Market Conditions is the weighted average of the percentage of IPOs that were priced 
above the midpoint of the price range in the 3 months preceding the IPO we are considering. 
The weight is 3 for the most recent month, 2 for the second-most recent month, and 1 for the 
third-most recent month. Log(proceeds) is the log of the dollar size of the offering, excluding 
overallotment shares. Positive 10-day Return is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 10-day 
return of the IPO is strictly positive, 0 otherwise. Institution’s Average Bid Price in the IPO is 
the weighted average price of the bids submitted by the investor (the weight is the number of 
shares in the bid), minus the midpoint of the filing range. Log(shares) is the log of the number 
of shares received by the investor. We report p-values (calculated with clustering at the IPO 
level) in parentheses below the regression coefficients. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Panel A: Initial returns and flipping 
Shares flipped as a fraction of the shares received  10-day return ≤ 0 
(6 IPOs) 
10-day return > 0 
(5 IPOs) 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
Institutions  33.6% 0 19.7% 0 
N  221 169 
Retail  52.5% 36%  7.8%  0 
N 15  21 
 
Panel B : Explaining flipping 
  Dependent variable: flipping ratio 
Deal Rank  -0.008 
  (0.22) 
IPO Market Conditions  0.399** 
  (0.01) 
Log(proceeds)  0.048** 
  (0.03) 
Positive 10-day Return  -0.155*** 
  (0.01) 
Institution’s Average Bid Price 
in the IPO  -0.042** 
  (0.04) 
Log(shares)  -0.058** 
  (0.02) 
Constant  -0.903 
  (0.90) 
R²  0.14 




Average percentage of high bids for institutional investors, by size of bids 
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Figure 2 
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Number of shares   
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Figure 3 
Underpricing and fraction of the shares received by institutional investors 
For each of the nineteen IPOs in our sample, this figure shows 10-day underpricing (y-
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